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The double intentionality of emotional experience 
Tom Cochrane 
Forthcoming in The European Journal of Philosophy1 
 
Abstract 
I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings 
contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily 
feelings represent a µstate of self¶, analysed as a sense of one¶s body affording certain patterns of 
interaction with the environment. Recognizing that there are two sources of intentional content in 
everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have 
about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between bodily-feeling 
based and appraisal-based theories of emotion.  
 
§1. Introduction 
The goal of this article is to show that the average emotional experience contains two 
distinguishable sources of intentional content. One of these is the emotional awareness of the 
situation and the other is the bodily feeling. *LYHQWKDWLW¶s fairly standard to think that emotions 
are representational states that generate ERGLO\ UHVSRQVHV WKLV FODLP VKRXOGQ¶W UHDOO\ EH YHU\
surprising. However, philosophers defending somatic views of emotions have typically wanted 
to unify the intentional content of emotions with bodily feelings as much as possible (e. g. 
Gunther 2004; Deonna and Teroni 2012; Barlassina and Newen 2013). A prominent example is 
-HVVH 3ULQ]¶V  SHUFHSWXDO PRGHO 3ULQ] FODLPV WKDW ZH SHUFHLYH HPRWLRQDO REMHFWV OLNH
µGDQJHU¶ RU µoffencH¶ LQ YLUWXH RI UHJLVWHULQJ ERGLO\ FKDQJHV WKDW DUH FDXVHG E\ dangers and 
offences. Thus according to Prinz, bodily feelings are the core constitutive feature of emotional 
experience. 
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 I have struggled a great deal to get this article to publication. It is the descendent of a paper I first submitted to a 
journal in August 2007, though the current version bears little resemblance with that original paper. Over the last 10 
years, the article has been submitted 22 times. It received 10 no comment rejections, 4 spiteful rejections, 4 
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7KHSHUFHSWXDOVWUXFWXUHRI3ULQ]¶VPRGHOKDVEHHQFULWLFL]HG in detail elsewhere, and it is not my 
concern to rehash these criticisms.2 I will restrict myself here to a point about phenomenology. 
Prinz draws an analogy between perceiving dangers in virtue of feeling bodily changes and 
seeing colours in virtue of retinal activity. Yet unlike the case of retinal activity, our bodily 
changes are not phenomenally transparent. That is, bodily changes are not something we fail to 
notice on our path towards getting in contact with the external situation, but rather objects of 
distinct experience. It takes considerable philosophical ingenuity to deny the seemingly obvious 
fact that feeling something happening in your body is not the same as attending to a dangerous 
situation. Prinz has to say that having the bodily changes reveal emotional features that are not 
RWKHUZLVH DYDLODEOH 7KXV KH PDNHV VWDWHPHQWV OLNH ³ZH IHHO WKH RIIHQVLYHQHVV RI H[WHUQDO
VLWXDWLRQVUHVRQDWLQJWKURXJKRXUIOHVK´. But while I find 3ULQ]¶VVWDWHPHQWDWWUDFWLYH
on closer examination the metaphor of resonance suggests that we experience a resemblance 
between the feeling and the offensiveness of the situation. If so, this would entail that we already 
have independent access to the situational offence, obviating the necessity of bodily feelings. 
 
At any rate, I will argue in this paper that we can display emotional awareness without the 
experience of bodily feelings. At the same time, there is something to be said for the claim that 
the bodily feelings capture emotional meaning in their own right. The bodily feelings we have 
when undergoing emotions are not simply patterns of bodily sensations. They feel decidedly 
appropriate to the situation. Other philosophers have picked up on this (e.g. Slaby 2012; Deonna 
& Teroni 2012: 76-90) yet in my opinion the meaningful nature of bodily feelings has yet to be 
clearly understood. We must first recognize that we can have emotions without bodily feelings, 
and then provide an independent account of how bodily feelings acquire emotional meaning. 
 
To argue for the double intentionality of emotional experience, in §2 of this paper I will present 
various reasons for thinking that we can have emotions without experiencing bodily feelings 
(though bodily responses may be necessary). However, I will also argue that some cases of mood 
show that bodily feelings can have emotional meaning in their own right. Then in §3 I will 
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articulate the intentional richness of emotional bodily feelings. I will reject some accounts that 
appeal to associations between bodily feelings and particular external objects and instead suggest 
that feelings represent the capacity of the body for certain patterns of interaction with the 
environment. Finally in §4 I will argue that recognizing the double intentionality of emotional 
experience helps us to understand the differing intuitions that people have about emotions more 
generally ,QGHHG LI ,¶P ULJKW DERXW ERGLO\ IHHOLQJV WKHUH DUH VLJQLILFDQW LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU WKH
longstanding debate within the philosophy of emotions between those who place bodily feelings 
central to emotions, and those who emphasize situational appraisals. Once we allow that there 
may be two sources of intentional content in an emotional experience, both of which deliver 
significant emotional meaning, we have a novel way to reconcile the opposing sides of this 
debate. Both sides may have said something right about emotional intentionality, and are only 
wrong if they claim to have a complete picture of what is going on. 
 
§2. Distinguishing emotions and bodily feelings 
 
§2.1 Emotions without bodily feelings 
In his book on emotions, Peter Goldie (2000) describes the following case: 
 
You are driving a car, and you see another car, out of control, approaching you on 
the wrong side of the road. You realise just what is going on, you see the danger to 
yourself and your passengers, and, with great speed and dexterity, you take the 
necessary evasive action. Then, when your car has finally come to a halt, you think 
with horror of just how close you were to death; you realise that you are bathed in a 
cold sweat, you see the whiteness of your knuckles as you still clench the steering 
wheel, and you feel your heart pumping. Looking back on the experience, you now 
agree that you were afraid whilst you were taking evasive action even though, you 
now can also say, you did not feel fear at that time. (2000: 62) 
 
Goldie uses this example to distinguish between reflective consciousness of one¶s emotion, and a 
state of being µunreflectively emotionally engDJHGZLWKWKHZRUOG¶ (2000: 64). It is in this latter 
sense that he means that the driver has an emotion while not feeling fear. This seems right. 
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Despite the driver¶s lack of awareness that he is undergoing an emotion, his understanding of the 
situation, his physiological responses and his behavioural reactions indicate that he is in an 
emotional state. Anyone observing him would judge that he is in a state of fear or panic.  
 
What is significantly lacking in the driver case however is (at the time) any feeling of the bodily 
responses involved. So if we agree that the driver is having an emotion, we must accordingly 
reject the Jamesian (1884) claim that emotions should be identified with the feeling of bodily 
changes. We need not reject James¶ claim that some pattern of bodily changes is necessary for an 
emotion. Indeed, I agree with James that when we fully introspect on our emotional states, we 
always discern some bodily activity at work. But this is quite separate from claiming that we 
must experience our bodily changes when undergoing an emotion.  
 
Now a Jamesian might respond to the driver case by suggesting that while reflective 
consciousness of bodily feelings may be lacking, this does not entail that unreflective feelings are 
also lacking. AfWHUDOO-DPHVKLPVHOIVWDWHVµour own bodily position, attitude, condition, is one 
of the things of which some awareness, however inattentive, invariably accompanies the 
knowledge of whatever else we know¶(1890: 242).  
 
We can however adjust the case to definitely rule out non-reflective consciousness of feelings, 
without I think, undermining the claim that the driver undergoes an emotion. For let us suppose 
that the driver has a condition such that he is incapable of experiencing bodily feelings. That is, 
ZKLOH WKH GULYHU¶V ERGLO\ UHVSRQVHV DUH PRQLWRUHG DQG JXLGHG DW VRPH VXE-personal level, he 
suffers a condition analogous to blindsight such that this monitoring is inaccessible to conscious 
awareness.3 The consequence of such a condition would entail that the driver loses the capacity 
to become aware of his emotions in a certain way. He would lose an intuitive sense of the 
affordances offered by his body, and would probably have trouble understanding some of the 
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 This is not to be confused with cases where blindsight patients are sometimes emotionally aroused by images 
presented to the neglected portion of their visual field (described as µEOLQGIULJKW¶E\6FDUDQWLQR,QVXFKFDVHV
patients report conscious emotional feelings, yet cannot identify the cause or target of their emotion. Similar 
phenomena occur in cases of alexithymia, as well as experiments in which arousing stimuli are presented too 
quickly for conscious recognition. These sorts of cases correspond better to the variety of moods I describe below. I 
would not however rule out the possibility that some severe cases of alexithymia could correspond to the condition I 
describe in this section. 
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ways in which emotions are described. But it seems that the most vital features of emotions 
would be retained. In particular, the bodily responses would retain their capacity to serve the 
interests of the subject in the ways that the bodily responses involved in emotions 
paradigmatically do. In the case described above, they protect the driver from the danger, 
regardless of whether or not he is able to experience those responses.  
 
§2.2 Situational phenomenology 
An alternative way to respond to the driver case would be to give up the claim that emotions are 
necessarily conscious, yet still demand that when emotions are conscious they necessarily 
involve bodily feelings. Accordingly, this view would entail denying that the driver is having a 
conscious emotional experience. However, this denial does not seem to be tenable, since from 
the first-person perspective, there is much about the driver¶s conscious experience that is 
emotional in tone. His visual and auditory experiences of the oncoming car (including perhaps a 
mental image of the anticipated crash) are suffused with an awareness of the danger that the 
situation instantiates. Moreover, this awareness is no idle observation. It plays an indispensable 
role in guiding his behavioural response. So it seems fair to say that the driver is consciously 
aware of the situation in an emotional way. 
 
Another way to put this point is that we should recognize the existence of distinctly emotional 
situational phenomenology. In support of this consideration, note all the ways in which we 
describe emotional experience without reference to bodily feelings. For example, we describe 
situations where everything seems to slow down or speed up, where the threat was looming 
menacingly, the world was spinning, other people seemed somehow distant, colours were more 
vivid or dulled, edges looked sharper or smoother, sounds were harsher, WKHDVVDLODQW¶s weapon 
filled our attention, we could never forget the expression on his face and so on. These 
situation-focused experiences are comparable to the driver case in reflecting a pattern of 
saliencies that play an important role in guiding WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V behavioural response. Note also 
that these experiences are implicitly subject-relating, since they involve the subject being 
oriented towards those features of the environment. 
 
Once we recognize the existence of emotional situational phenomenology, one of the core 
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motivations for thinking that bodily feelings are necessary to emotions is undermined. The 
motivating intuition seems to be that bodily feelings make a vital contribution the evaluative 
nature of emotions. In particular, ERGLO\IHHOLQJVSURYLGHµKHDW¶RUµFRORXU¶WRDFROGDSSUDLVDORI
the situation. However, once we recognize the non-bodily phenomenology of emotions, we no 
longer need bodily feelings to add colour to a cold appraisal, and naturally it would be question 
EHJJLQJ WR VLPSO\ DVVHUW WKDW WKH GULYHU¶V DZDUHQHVV PXVW SRVVHVV VXFK FRORXULQJ IURP bodily 
feelings to qualify as an emotion.  
 
We can also undercut the appeal of emotional colouring by noting that bodily responses can 
contribute to the evaluative nature of emotions without being felt. Note that the intensity and 
suddenness of the driver¶s avoidant responses are appropriate to the imminent and potentially 
catastrophic nature of the threat at hand. In virtue of responding in an urgent, aversive manner, 
the bodily responses may be said to track the urgent and aversive nature of the target. In this 
sense, the combination of environmental awareness and appropriate bodily response delivers an 
intentional state that is functionally evaluative in nature. This is no mere disinterested 
recognition of the danger but an active engagement with it. So it looks like emotions can satisfy 
both regulative and evaluative functions without the aid of bodily feelings. This kind of 
responsiveness only requires an awareness of one¶s relationship with the environment.  
 
§2.3 Emotion intentionality 
A final consideration against the necessity of feelings follows from the intentional content of 
emotions. Many philosophers think that our emotions are directed at particular objects (e.g. 
Deonna and Teroni 2012; Goldie 2000; Solomon 2007). This coheres with our ordinary way of 
VD\LQJ µI was afraid of crashing¶ or, µI was happy about my promotion¶. Yet it does not seem 
possible to discover such situational contents in the bodily feelings themselves. The only 
particular situational content that could be found in bodily feelings is the specific condition of 
the body, which is only rarely the object of an emotional state.  
 
Now it may be that when consciously experiencing an emotion, the individual takes a further 
step in associating their bodily feeling with the particular object (this seems to be the move that 
both Goldie 2000 and Deonna and Teroni 2012 opt for, to be discussed below). But relying on 
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such association would entail that there are occasions where bodily feelings are not associated 
the experience of the situation. Thus someone defending the essential role of bodily feelings in 
emotional experience would have to claim that the experience of the particular object only 
becomes emotional once the bodily feeling gets associated with it. However, the onus would be 
on the defender of such a view to explain why such an association is necessarily required, when 
the individual can seemingly perform the practical and evaluative roles of emotions without such 
associations, and when non-bodily based emotional phenomenology is readily available.  
 
While I endorse the view that emotions include a representation of the particular object, it is 
worth noting that the defender of the intentionality of bodily feelings may reach for an alternate 
view. They may claim that, despite our ordinary ways of talking, emotions are not really about 
particular objects, but only formal objects such as µdanger¶ or µthe loss of something valued¶ (e.g. 
Lazarus 1991; Prinz 2004). Perhaps this kind of formal content can be captured by feelings. 
Indeed I want to allow that bodily feelings capture content that is somewhat generalised in nature, 
and will elaborate further on this idea below. But for now it is sufficient to note that bodily 
feelings are not necessary for emotions to track formal objects. We can appeal to a similar point 
that was made in §2.2. If the unfelt bodily responses combined with situational awareness are 
sufficient to show that the individual is sensitive, in an evaluative manner, to a particular object, 
then we can employ the same resources to say that the individual is sensitive to the formal 
qualities of the situation. We need only add that the sensitivity corresponds to certain types of 
object.4 
 
§2.4 Moods 
The arguments presented so far seem sufficient to justify the claim that bodily feelings are not 
necessary for emotions. However this should not be taken to imply that feelings are unimportant 
features of ordinary emotional experience. On the contrary, I want to argue that bodily feelings 
can be distinctly emotional in nature, and that in the average emotional experience they can play 
a very important role for the individual. So at this point, we must note that not only can there be 
emotions without bodily feelings, but also that we can have emotional bodily feelings while 
lacking emotions about particular objects. These emotional bodily feelings are not emotions, 
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PRGHO of emotions, which allows for unconscious cases.  
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strictly speaking, but I think it fair to include them within a broader category of emotional 
experience (or affective experience, if one prefers). 
 
Consider the following scenario: Over the course of a day, someone steals your parking space 
just as you are about to drive into it, you find you¶ve run out of coffee, your computer crashes 
before you can save an important document, you mislay your wallet and must spend half an hour 
searching for it, and your boss imposes a tedious, but urgent task upon you. In each case you feel 
some degree of frustration, and indeed unfortunate events seem to be piling up, such that by the 
time you trip over a kink in the rug on the way out, you¶ve just about had enough. Since you 
resolve each of these individual incidents, you manage to put them out of your mind. However 
you return home with a pervasive bodily feeling of discomfort; almost as if you had been 
repeatedly pushed about or prodded. In the state you are in, the slightest provocation is liable to 
enrage you.  
 
Typically we would describe what you feel at the end of day as a certain kind of mood, though 
WKH WHUP µPRRG¶JORVVHVover different phenomena that I think should be distinguished. In the 
case above, it seems that the repeated trigger of a certain emotional response causes our bodily 
systems to linger in a certain configuration that is highly congruent with the further arousal of 
similar emotional responses. It is not hard to imagine why such lingering might be useful, even 
when the particular situations have been put out of mind. Any creature inhabiting an 
environment that repeatedly calls for a certain adaptive response, such as fleeing or fighting, will 
more quickly or efficiently initiate that response if their bodily configurations are already in the 
relevant state. Thus it is not surprising that a good deal of empirical evidence (surveyed in a 
meta-review by Yiend 2009) suggests that we display biases towards recollecting or interpreting 
events in ways congruent with a previously induced emotional state.5 
 
Of particular interest here however, is that absent any particular object at which one¶s bodily 
response is directed, the individual experiences a bodily feeling that conveys a rather general sort 
of emotional attitude. The individual reports that he or she feels frustrated or depressed or 
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 For a detailed discussion of this dispositional variety of mood, see Siemer 2009. For a discussion of moods as 
patterns of vigilance, see Price 2006.  
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anxious. I will have more to say about the content of such feelings in §3.2 and §3.3 below. In 
particular, we have yet to determine whether these feelings have distinctive intentional content, 
and if so, how this is to be characterised. But for now it appears that we can be both reflectively 
conscious of such emotional bodily feelings as well as non-reflectively guided by them in our 
interpretations of events, while lacking the emotional experience of any particular object.  
 
Alongside moods, long term affective states such as depression, generalised nervousness or 
incorrigible enthusiasm display similar sorts of cognitive biases and general attitudes. 
Importantly for me, while such attitudes are not directed at any particular object, they seem 
characteristically to involve certain patterns of bodily feeling; one is chronically disposed to feel 
heavy and languid in the case of depression, tense and jittery in the case of nervousness, 
energetic and restless in the case of enthusiasm. It is likely that such long-term states arise from 
stable reconfigurations of the psycho-biological system, which are then reinforced by specific 
emotional appraisals. I will have more to say about whether emotional bodily feelings can lack 
prior appraisals of a particular object in §3.5 below. For now it is sufficient to observe that there 
are at least some long-term affective states that would intuitively be described as emotional while 
the individual can honestly report that they are not depressed, anxious or enthusiastic about any 
particular thing.  
 
Perhaps it might be complained that the cases of mood I have described still involve an emotion 
about a particular object, just one that is unconscious, or non-reflectively grasped. The onus is on 
my opponent to prove the need for such appraisals, particularly when we have plausible 
psycho-biological routes towards the cases described that obviate the appeal to unconscious or 
implicit particular objects. ,W¶V DOVR SRVVLEOH WR H[SHULHQWLDOO\ GLIIHUHQWLDWH WKH FDVHV , KDYH
described from ones where we sense a hidden object or reason. In such cases, subtle cues manage 
to trigger a bodily response while we are unaware of their target. We say to ourselves µsomething 
MXVW GRHVQ¶W IHHO ULJKW¶ or, µfor some reason, I feel optimistic about today¶. Crucially, we are 
aware of undergoing an emotion, and that it probably has an object. And in the absence of any 
conscious recognition of this object, we can attend to the bodily feeling, and wonder what 
justifies it. This sort of detail does not attend the other cases of moods I have described, so there 
LVQ¶W PXFK PRWLYDWLRQ WR VXSSRVH WKDW VRPH XQFRQVFLRXV DSSUDLVDO of a particular object is in 
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operation in those cases.  
 
§2.5 Reflective emotional consciousness 
Taken together, the cases presented above indicate that there is a double dissociation between the 
emotional experience of bodily feelings and the emotional experience of particular situations. 
Either can occur without the other. This distinction also cuts across the distinction between 
reflective and non-reflective consciousness. The case of moods indicates that we can have either 
reflective or non-reflective consciousness of bodily feelings while lacking any concurrent 
emotional experience of a particular situation. The driver case meanwhile suggests that we could 
have either reflective or non-reflective emotional experience of particular situations while 
entirely lacking bodily feelings (even where bodily responses are considered necessary to 
emotions).  
 
In general, it is easier to make the distinction between the emotional experience of situations and 
the experience of bodily feelings in scenarios characterised by non-reflective consciousness. This 
is because reflective consciousness of an emotion tends (though not necessarily) to bring with it 
attention to one¶s internal state that will deliver the experience of bodily feelings. The distinction 
between bodily feelings and the emotional experience of situations can, however, be appreciated 
where both are reflectively experienced. Consider for instance the following case: I once 
received an automated phone call from the bank informing me of a number of suspicious recent 
transactions that had emptied my account of several thousand pounds. As I was impotently 
forced to listen to the machine-toned voice intoning these worrying transactions, many of the 
same reactions that accompanied the driver case²muscle tension, raised heart rate, a cold 
sweat²were triggered. Constrained as I was, it was easy for me to attend to my bodily feelings 
LQ LVRODWLRQ IURP P\ DZDUHQHVV RI WKH VLWXDWLRQDO WKUHDW ,Q SDUWLFXODU LW ZDVQ¶W VLPSO\ WKDW ,
could pick out my bodily responses as an atomised set of distinct components. I could attend to 
the overall bodily pattern or gestalt, its general anxious or frustrated character, in isolation from 
the particular situation that the responses were aimed at. 
 
In conceptually sophisticated cases of emotion especially, we are often inhibited from acting in 
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the ways that our bodies are pushing us to behave (one does not flee the phone call).6 In such 
cases, we often form evaluative attitudes towards our bodily feelings that are distinct from the 
evaluative stance taken by the emotion itself. If one is disconsolate after being rejected by a lover 
for instance, one¶s body may seem to ache for renewed contact, even while one wishes to rid 
oneself of such troublesome feelings. Similarly, panic attacks seem to be cases where an 
exaggerated fear response is triggered by a relatively innocuous worry. Sufferers of this 
condition report that the panic response itself becomes the object of fear. These cases again 
indicate our ability to direct attention distinctly towards our bodily feelings.  
 
§3. Meaningful feelings 
So far I have suggested that bodily feelings are not necessary for emotions. However bodily 
feelings can provide additional content that conveys a sort of general emotional gestalt or attitude. 
These claims seem to accord bodily feelings a strictly peripheral role in emotions. Moreover, 
some might claim that the cases of mood and long-term affective conditions described in the 
previous sections hardly count as emotional in their own right. They lack intentional content that 
reflects the world-oriented status of the individual; they are mere patterns of bodily sensation. 
The goal of this section is to deny that emotional bodily feelings are mere patterns of sensation, 
or simply conscious experiences of a certain aspect of the emotional process. Bodily feelings 
also convey emotional meaning in their own right.  
 
Consider a strong bodily feeling of fear. It seems plain that this bodily feeling, in its own right, 
powerfully and vividly conveys a sense of vulnerability. Similarly, if one feels sad upon the 
occasion of a loved one¶s death, the property of loss is bound up in the bodily feel of the emotion 
such that LW LV QDWXUDO WR VD\ µ, IHHO ORVV« , really feel like something vital is missing¶. These 
kinds of report indicate that the feelings themselves possess intentional content. At the same time, 
there does not seem to be anything intrinsically vulnerable about the feeling of vulnerability, or 
loss-like about the feeling of loss. In themselves they are patterns of fluttering sensations. So it 
seems that our bodily feelings are experienced as possessing content that reaches beyond the 
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 Though it is worth noting that even with regards to conceptually construed sources of harm, our bodily responses 
serve to orient us towards the threat represented. Heightened arousal and attention directly sustain our more 
cognitively sophisticated responses, and as in the driver case, our bodily responses quite generally track the 
seriousness and urgency of the situation.  
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sensation itself. That is, emotional bodily feelings are experienced as representational, rather 
than immediate and incorrigible presentations of bodily sensation. The concern of this and the 
next few sections is to provide a coherent articulation of just what it is that these bodily feelings 
could represent.  
 
§3.1 Association-based accounts 
Since we (normally) already have an emotional representation of the particular object, we may 
prefer to fold the intentionality of the bodily feeling into that. One might say that we experience 
WKHSDUWLFXODUREMHFWRIRQH¶VHPRWLRQwith the bodily feeling, in the sense that the bodily feeling 
accompanies, EXWLVVWULFWO\VSHDNLQJVHSDUDEOHIURPRQH¶VHPRWLRQDOH[SHUience of the situation. 
7KLV VHHPV WR EH 3HWHU *ROGLH¶V DSSURDFK. Like me, Goldie distinguishes between the 
intentionality of the emotion and the intentionality of the bodily feeling, and initially states that 
the latter is directed at the overall condition of the body (2000: 51). However, in recognition of 
the meaningful quality of bodily feelings, he suggests that feelings display µborrowed 
intentionality¶ (2000: 54-57). 7KH\ EHFRPH µunitHG LQ FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ (2000: 55) with the 
awareness of the object. As best as I can understand this, borrowed intentionality amounts to an 
association made by the subject between the bodily feeling and their awareness of the particular, 
external object of the emotional state. In virtue of this association, our bodily pangs seem to be 
about the situation.  
 
While I agree with Goldie that everyday emotional experience may blend the awareness of the 
body with the awareness of the situation, I think that the notion of borrowed intentionality fails 
to acknowledge the special contribution that bodily feelings make to emotional experience. First 
DQGIRUHPRVWERGLO\IHHOLQJVUHSUHVHQWWKHFRQGLWLRQRIRQH¶V body. The idea that bodily feelings 
borrow intentionality from the awareness of the situation depreciates the immediacy with which 
they convey information about the body. 
 
$VRPHZKDWVLPLODUSRVLWLRQWR*ROGLH¶VLVSUHVHQWHGE\'HRQQDDQG7HURQLWhough they 
may not welcome my saying so). Deonna and Teroni are keen to emphasise that emotions are 
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directed at particular objects rather than formal objects (2012: 77-78).7 But they also claim that 
HPRWLRQV DUH µIHOW ERGLO\ VWDQFHV¶ (2012: 76). To explain WKLV 'HRQQD DQG 7HURQL ZULWH µwe 
should conceive of emotions as distinctive types of bodily awareness, where the subject 
experiences her body holistically as taking an attitude towards a certain object¶ (2012: 79). The 
QRWLRQRIµDWWLWXGH¶LVLPSRUWDQWIRU'HRQQDDQG7HURQLEHFDXVHWKH\GRQ¶WZDQWWRVD\WKHERGLO\
responses are representational states. Rather the response can be understood as a mode or manner 
of awareness. Here Deonna and Teroni are drawing on the proposition-attitude distinction that is 
common in functionalist accounts of mental states (2012: 90). That is, just as one can take 
differing attitudes towards the same proposition (e.g. believe it, desire it, intend it) so one can 
take differing emotional attitudes towards the same object. So the snarling dog can be 
approached fearfully, or joyfully or despairingly, depending on the response it triggers. 
 
2Q'HRQQDDQG7HURQL¶VYLHZWKHHPRWLRQLV WULJJHUHGE\ZKDW WKH\FDOO WKHµFRJQLWLYHEDVH¶
This is the perception, imagination or inference that picks up on certain qualities of the particular 
object. It is not the emotion itself. But if the cognitive base is not the emotion, it is unclear what 
part of the emotion itself coveys its intentional object. The bodily feeling alone cannot capture it, 
as I argued in §2.3. So if Deonna and Teroni want to say that emotions have particular 
intentional objects (which they clearly want to do) they cannot fully identify emotions with 
bodily feelings. Instead, it looks like some association or projection of the bodily feeling onto the 
particular object is required, DVLQ*ROGLH¶VWKHRU\Indeed, this seems to fit with the way they say 
that the subject experiences her body as taking an attitude towards an object. Yet if this is 
'HRQQDDQG7HURQL¶VYLHZ they need to explain how the particular object gets mentally united 
with the bodily feeling (if at all). Otherwise, it is uncertain what determines the direction of the 
bodily feeling towards the particular object rather than some other completely different object.8 
 
As an analysis in which emotional intentionality is partly constituted by response dispositions, I 
DPV\PSDWKHWLFWR'HRQQDDQG7HURQL¶VSRVLWLRQ'HRQQDDQG7HURQLDFFXUDWHO\UHFRJQL]HWKDWLQ
episodic emotions, bodily responses are set up to manage particular situations (i.e. the threat that 
the dog bears towards the individual) and so appealing to responses can potentially explain 
                                                 
7
 'HRQQDDQG7HURQLFODLPWKDWIRUPDOREMHFWVZKLFKWKH\FDOOµHYDOXDWLYHSURSHUWLHV¶SOD\DMXVWLI\LQJUROHIRUWKH
emotion, but are not what the emotion itself is directed at. 
8Cf. %DUODVVLQD	1HZHQ¶VFULWLFLVPRI3ULQ]¶VPRGHOVHFWLRQ.4).  
14 
 
something about emotion intentionality. But as an analysis of emotional experience, I think their 
account is confused. Their key mistake is to assume that so long as you experience RQH¶VERGLO\ 
responses as an emotional gestalt, you must experience them as directed towards the particular 
object. This is simply not the case. Deonna and Teroni seem to recognize that bodily feelings 
have emotional meaning, and one that is naturally complementary to the particular situational 
content of the emotion, but they are wrong to try and force that meaning into the experience of 
the situation.9 Bodily feelings most immediately tell us about the condition and capacities of 
RQH¶VERG\ 
 
Overall, I find these accounts of feeling that (seem to) appeal to associations with particular 
external objects to be unsatisfying. Instead, I suggest that we give a more substantive 
characterisation of the awareness of the body itself. 
 
§3.2 The emotional homunculus 
Consider again the case in which a car crash seems imminent. But let us now suppose that you 
feel all those bodily responses that are triggered to help get you out of danger. Intuitively, your 
bodily feelings carry a definite intentional content about the status of your body. Amongst other 
things, your muscles tense in anticipation of the impact. So we might say that bodily feelings 
represent a quite immediate relationship between the subject and his or her situation, in this case 
a feeling of one¶s body as being about to be hit or damaged.  
 
Feeling this kind of relationship to the environment makes sense in relatively primitive cases of 
emotion, but one also experiences much the same pattern of bodily reactions in the financial 
fraud case. In such cases it is far less straightforward to say that you feel like you¶re about to be 
hit by something. The anticipated µhit¶ is metaphorical. The same goes for most cases of bodily 
feelings in emotion. Anxiety for instance, may be characterized by a bodily feeling of instability, 
yet one¶s body need not actually be unstable or even at risk of physical instability. One might 
                                                 
9
 In their reliance on bodily feelings, Deonna and Teroni also cannot allow for the driver cases described in §2.1. 
$OWKRXJK 'HRQQD DQG 7HURQL EULHIO\ DOOXGH WR *ROGLH¶V H[DPSOH  7) they claim that in the aftermath of 
narrowly avoiding the crash, the driver experiences his various bodily responses atomistically, and not as a 
meaningful gestalt. As mentioned above when describing the financial fraud case, such an atomistic perspective is 
possible, but not necessary.  
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rather be sitting in a chair on a sunny day rehearsing an important speech. What may be literally 
true in this case is that one is currently unable to cope with this task, and the failure to complete 
this task will harm one¶s reputation. Similarly, the feeling of emotional pressure involves a 
non-literal sense of something weighing upon you, or constricting you, where what is literally 
true is that increasing work demands are being placed upon you, and you recognize that you may 
not be able to meet those demands.  
 
There is even experimental evidence that these non-literal meanings are more than merely 
fanciful interpretations of obscure bodily sensations. In one experiment, (Zhong & Leonardelli 
2008) it was observed that people made to feel social exclusion judged the ambient temperature 
to be lower and showed a preference for warmer food. In a similar experiment (Zhong & 
Liljenquist 2006) it was observed that people who read a first-person account of an act of 
sabotage showed a greater preference for antiseptic wipes. The authors conclude that the subjects 
felt a sense of dirtiness associated with guilt. It seems then that our common, non-literal 
understandings of bodily feelings are robust enough to guide relevant bodily responses and 
behaviours.10 
 
We can construe these non-literal representations of the bodily organism as somewhat analogous 
to those diagrams of the body homunculus, in which the body is spatially distorted according to 
the tactile sensitivity of its various parts (for instance, its hands and lips are huge compared to its 
skinny legs). An emotional representation of the homunculus can vary in even more extreme 
ways. It may seem relatively solid, large, dirty, rough or on fire. It is precisely these variations 
that are captured in stylised artistic depictions of the human body. Consider for instance the 
difference between Alberto Giacometti¶s and Henry Moore¶s sculptures. Both artists convey a 
sense of the human body that we can intuitively recognize as possible transformations of bodily 
feeling; to put it roughly²distended and brittle in the case of Giacometti, solid and smooth in 
the case of Moore. Consider also the case of non-vocal music. It has long been recognized that 
non-vocal music lacks the resources to represent particular situational content (e.g. Kivy 1999). 
                                                 
10
 These considerations align well with the theory of conceptual metaphor defended by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), 
which argues that our metaphorical forms of speech (e. g. µKHKLWPHZLWKWKHQHZV¶) are rooted in sensory-motor 
experience. If our emotions are accompanied by certain typical patterns of bodily changes, we can expect a fair 
amount of agreement about which metaphors are appropriate for which feelings.  
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Yet most listeners agree that music conveys specific emotions with intense vividness. A 
plausible suggestion is that music is managing to capture a sense of emotional bodily feeling 
rather than situational emotional content. 7KLVDOLJQVZHOOZLWKFRQWHPSRUDU\µSHUVRQD¶WKHRULHV
of musical expressivity (e.g. Levinson 2005; Robinson 2005; Cochrane 2011).  
 
§3.3 Emotional space 
At the same time, our emotional feelings give us a sense of being embedded within an 
µemotional space¶. One may feel that something heavy is weighing one down, or that one is 
floating in thin air. In this way the sense of emotional space is one in which certain actions seem 
encouraged. For instance, when we feel joy, the emotional space seems bright, boundless, even 
springy. We may then manifest this sense of emotional space by actually running, jumping or 
dancing around, or we may more generally interact with the actual environment in an energetic 
or springy manner. Phenomenologically speaking, our sense of emotional space may seem to 
overlay our sense of real space.  
 
It is this sense of emotional space that I think gives us a clue to what is represented in emotional 
bodily feelings. In more psychologically oriented terms, the bodily feeling represents the 
affordances offered by own bodies in relation to the external environment.11 As was noted above 
with regards to mood, we may say that we display a certain dispositional attitude towards the 
world, but here we construe the attitude in more behavioural terms. The bodily feelings represent 
to us, at a quite general level, the potential or preparedness for certain environmental 
interactions. When one is having an emotion about a specific object, the bodily responses are in 
fact geared towards a specific environmental interaction. But lacking in themselves any 
information about the particular situation, the feelings of those responses represent the capacities 
or dispositions of the person related only in a very general way to the environment (an emotional 
space). 
 
                                                 
11
 Occasionally Prinz makes comments that resemble this account of bodily feelings when, for instance, he 
FRPSDUHVHPRWLRQVWRDIIRUGDQFHV,QWKLVFDVHKHUHIHUHQFHV*LEVRQ¶VQRWLRQRISRVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYH
DIIRUGDQFHVEXWQRWHWKDW*LEVRQGRHVQ¶WIOHVKRXWWKLVFODLPYHU\PXFKHLWKHU More recently Rebekka 
Hufendiek (2016) has proposed a view of emotional experience that appeals to the sense of affordances. However, 
like other somaticist views, Hufendiek places bodily feelings too central to the core of emotional representation for 
my liking. 
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Thus metaphorical descriptions of bodily feeling capture in an intuitive and nuanced manner the 
various bodily capacities and dispositions for environmental interaction that are deployed in our 
emotional responses. Then when it comes to clarifying the subtly varying phenomenology of 
bodily feelings, it is helpful to appeal to a few abstract dimensions. For instance, in an earlier 
paper (Cochrane 2009) I delineated eight dimensions of emotional experience. These dimensions 
include positive-negative valence, power-weakness, certainty-uncertainty, a sense of social 
connectedness or isolation, and the overall temporal envelope of the feeling which convey 
qualities like duration and the sense of something upcoming or passing away.12 In that article I 
argued that these dimensions are sufficient for finely distinguishing emotional types. Here I 
claim that these dimensions also apply to bodily feelings, and so our feelings can equally allow 
us to identify very specific emotional states. For instance, the bodily feeling of fear generally 
involves a sense of weakness, where the onset of that weakness could appear gradually (anxiety), 
or more suddenly (panic). Meanwhile, sadness also seems to involve the sense of weakness, yet 
differing temporally from fear in that one senses not losing stability or anticipating impact so 
much as having fallen or having been hit.  
 
Overall, our emotional bodily feelings constitute a rich resource of vivid and nuanced content 
about our status. Moreover, while these feelings seem intuitively to go beyond the literal 
condition of the bodily organism, it can still be the case that our status is accurately represented. 
The fraudulent bank transactions really do put me in a vulnerable situation with regards to my 
legal and financial status and so it is quite appropriate that I feel vulnerable when placed in that 
personal context. This content is conveyed by means of an intuitive bodily sense of fragility or 
instability. And when we look closer, we can understand this feeling as representing a reduced 
capacity for control over one¶s environment and a disposition towards self-protecting behaviours. 
 
§3.4 Distinguishing emotional bodily feelings 
We are now in a position to distinguish emotional bodily feelings both from the emotional 
awareness of situations and from non-emotional bodily feelings. First, we should note that both 
emotional bodily feelings and the emotional awareness of situations are relational in character. 
                                                 
12
 In that article I also specify a dimension of freedom-FRQVWUDLQW ZKLFK PRUH UHFHQWO\ ,¶YH GHFLGHG WR GURS DV
unnecessary. I also specify DGLPHQVLRQRIµJHQHUDOLW\¶ZKLFKapplies more to differentiating emotions from moods 
and long-term sentiments, rather than differentiating within the field of emotions or bodily feelings.  
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As mentioned in §2.2, the experience of the situation is implicitly relational since to see an object 
as threateningly looming is for RQH¶VERG\WREHRULHQWHGWRZDUGVLWLQDFHUWDLQZD\. However 
situational phenomenology focuses centrally on the particular object of the emotion. Meanwhile, 
emotional bodily feelings are relational in the sense that one experiences certain possibilities for 
interaction. However the environment is represented in a peripheral and very abstract way. It is 
the condition and capacities of the body that are central and particular. Thus while both sorts of 
intentional experience are relational there is a significant difference in focus. Another significant 
difference is that the situational phenomenology is essentially a passive representation of how 
things stand, where the emotional bodily feeling is representing the active powers of body to 
respond. This difference has implications for the possible function of emotional bodily feelings, 
as I will discuss in the following section. 
 
Let us now distinguish emotional bodily feelings from feelings of bodily conditions such as 
tiredness, hunger and nausea which intuitively lack emotional meaning. When one is hungry, one 
FDQ DWWHQG WR WKH FRQGLWLRQ RI RQH¶V ERG\ ZLWKRXW LW VD\LQJ DQ\WKLQJ LQ SDUWLFXODU DERXW RQH¶V
general response capacities. This suggests three rough conditions for emotional bodily feelings: 
First, emotional bodily feelings are experienced as relational in character, as giving one a sense 
of emotional space or generalised environmental affordances. Second, emotional bodily feelings 
tend to be experienced as a state of the whole person, rather than some isolated bodily 
component. Third emotional bodily feelings tend to be experienced as irruptive rather than 
routine. Typically, feelings like hunger and tiredness occur predictably at certain times of the day 
as part of our ordinary bodily maintenance cycle. 
 
I must emphasise that these conditions provide only a vague boundary. There may be emotional 
bodily feelings that are acute and routine (for instance, the actor feels butterflies in his stomach 
every single time he goes on stage). Some varieties of non-emotional feeling also seem to fit the 
conditions (consider for instance, a sudden and powerful craving for pizza). However, we may 
have reasons for thinking that a difference of degree is appropriate here. First, because bodily 
feelings are not necessary to emotional states, we need not expect a sharp distinction between 
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bodily feelings of an emotional and non-emotional kind.13 Second, a close relationship between 
moods and bodily conditions like tiredness and hunger is widely recognized. We are apt to blame 
the emergence of a mood on physical tiredness, and we know that moods can be easily 
manipulated with bodily intoxicants like drugs and alcohol.  
 
Nevertheless, the distinctive representational force of emotional bodily feelings suggests that a 
distinctive representational act occurs. For this reason, I propose that a definitive distinguishing 
feature of emotional bodily feelings is that the individual applies an emotion concept to his or her 
bodily feelings. What the three conditions outlined above do is just tell us roughly what the 
emotion concept amounts to. That is, the individual deploys a concept of emotional space, or 
generalised behavioural affordances in cognitively organising the feelings of his or her bodily 
condition. This concept need not be propositionally articulated. I think it more likely to be a 
prototype of how one tends to behave when undergoing an emotional state.14 It moreover need 
not be gained from a sophisticated self-UHIOHFWLYH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI RQH¶V SULRU H[SHULHQFH RI
emotion. It may just be a concept we characteristically deploy when guiding an emotional 
response. 
 
One reason for appealing to a conceptual act comes from the claim I made in §2.4 that emotional 
bodily feelings may be generated either by lingering bodily responses, or emergent bodily 
conditions. In cases where bodily feelings reflect bodily responses that have been triggered by a 
prior emotional appraisal, it would be fair to say that those bodily feelings carry information 
about the emotional state of the individual. That might be enough to differentiate emotional 
bodily feelings from non-emotional bodily feelings. However, cases where a distinctive bodily 
condition is aroused prior to the emotional appraisal of a particular situation cannot make use of 
this strategy. Emergent cases are more effectively explained by appeal to a conceptual act.  
                                                 
13
 Meanwhile a sharper boundary can be drawn between the emotions and affective states such as pain, hunger and 
tiredness. I do not have the space to fully outline this view here, but the basic idea is that while pains and pleasures 
are directed at immediate impacts upon the body, our emotions are essentially contextual in intentional content. For 
instance, fear is paradigmatically directed at future circumstances, regret is directed at ways things could have been, 
and jealousy concerns our social attachments. I have more to say on this subject in a book I am currently preparing 
on emotions. 
14
 For a discussion of prototype theories of concepts see Laurence & Margolis (1999). I take it that this kind of 
concept is relatively undemanding, and so should be available to various non-human animals. However it is more 
demanding than simply having an emotion, so there may be emotion-bearing animals that lack emotional bodily 
feelings. 
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To explain, recall that in the case of depression, the LQGLYLGXDO¶V bodily condition was close 
enough to a distinctive sort of emotional response to dispose them towards congruent emotional 
appraisals. The individual does not just more readily trigger certain bodily responses, they more 
readily remember and attend to sad situations. But why should memories and appraisals of loss 
become more salient? The easiest way to explain this is that the individual at least implicitly 
recognises that they feel the way they do when they feel sad; they conceptualise the feeling of 
their bodily capacities in a certain way.  
 
Thus, in addition to capturing the distinctive representational force of bodily feelings, the appeal 
to conceptualisation as a key condition for emotional bodily feeling can explain emergent 
condition cases, and equally apply to lingering feeling cases. If the reader does not acknowledge 
emergent condition cases, this advantage will be less impressive. Such a reader may instead 
prefer the idea that emotional bodily feelings carry information about prior emotional appraisals 
as mentioned above. However, the reader would still need to make sense of the way we 
experience bodily feelings as intentionally meaningful; reaching beyond the mere sensation of 
the body. I find it hard to see how this could be sustained, unless one alternatively appeals to a 
definite association with the emotional appraisal (as Goldie 2000 and Deonna and Teroni 2012 
seem to do). But then it looks like establishing a semantic relationship between the feeling and 
the situational appraisal is still needed. So at least with regards to parsimony, WKHUH¶V QR 
advantage of this approach over the conceptual approach I have described. And to reiterate the 
point I made with UHJDUGV WR *ROGLH¶V PRGHO, WKHUH¶V VRPH GLVDGYDQWDJH in appealing to an 
indirect attribution of meaning to the feeling WKDWGRHVQ¶WIRFXVRQWKHcharacteristics of the body 
itself.  
 
Meanwhile, I am inclined to think that if a person claims to feel depressed or hopeless about their 
personal status, and they display the usual bodily profile of sadness, we should believe them, 
even if they have not appraised some specific loss prior to making this claim. Yet at the same 
time, we should not allow that an LQGLYLGXDOFDQLQIDOOLEO\GHFLGHZKHWKHURUQRWWKH\¶UHKDYLQJ
an emotional bodily feeling. Karen Jones (2008: 269-270) nicely illustrates our fallibility with 
two examples from fiction. In the novel Oranges are not the only fruit, the mother mistakes a 
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stomach ulcer for feelings of love. In Brokeback Mountain, Ennis misinterprets intense yearning 
as food poisoning. This fallibility suggests the need for an additional condition that can specify 
when it is warranted, or appropriate to conceSWXDOLVHRQH¶Vbodily feelings under an emotional 
gestalt.  
 
My proposal is that iIRQH¶VRYHUDOO ERGLO\ FRQGLWLRQGRHV LQ IDFW correspond to the pattern of 
bodily responses that is standardly aroused by a certain emotion, then the individual is warranted 
to conceptualise the feelings of their bodily condition as the state of self most complementary to 
that emotional state. That is, x is an emotional bodily feeling when: 1) the individual 
conceptualises (implicitly or explicitly) bodily feelings as emotional, and 2) the individual is in a 
bodily condition that matches the typical condition of their body when undergoing an emotion 
about a particular situation.  
 
Conditions like these are analogous to conditions that are plausibly given for pictorial 
representation. That is, a visual pattern is a picture of a tree if: 1) the viewer deploys a 
recognitional concept of a tree with respect to the visual pattern and 2) the visual pattern 
resembles the outline shape of a tree (cf. Hopkins 2005). In both emotions and pictures, there is 
both something artificial and something quite natural about their representational status.  
 
Thus Ennis inappropriately construes his bodily feelings because his feelings do not carry 
information about the biological condition of indigestion. He realises later on that his feelings are 
more appropriately conceptualised as emotional, because they most closely resemble the feelings 
you get when your bodily response is aimed at renewing contact with your beloved. To be clear, 
prior to him conceptualising them as emotional (assuming this is not already done unconsciously) 
the bodily feelings did not independently represent an emotional state of self. Rather they could 
justifiably have been used to do so.  
 
The mother meanwhile was not actually feeling a bodily condition that corresponded with a 
disposition to renew contact with her lover (the condition would not have been impacted much 
had she succeeded). She was simply confused about the kinds of patterns of bodily affordances 
that love typically involves (at least as we ordinarily understand the patterns of feeling that love 
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involves).15 
 
It strikes me that recognising the somewhat artificially representational nature of emotional 
bodily feeling PLJKW DFFRPPRGDWH WR VRPH GHJUHH µFRUH DIIHFW¶ WKHRULHV RI HPRWLRQ LQ
psychology (e.g. Russell & Barrett 1999). According to these theories, our non-interpreted 
emotional responses only intrinsically possess a certain degree of valence and a certain degree of 
arousal. The (culturally influenced) interpretation of the individual then reconceptualises core 
affect, plus the awareness of the situation, into the various discrete emotion types that we 
recognize. Now, I am not sympathetic to the denial of natural emotion types corresponding to 
distinctive ways of appraising situations and distinctive patterns of response. However if taken to 
focus only on bodily feelings and not the emotional experience of situations, it may be right to 
say that without some conceptual framework to deliver representational meaning, bodily feelings 
only present a certain degree of arousal in themselves.16 
 
§3.5 The function of emotional bodily feelings 
Now we know what emotional bodily feelings are, there is one striking question that remains 
outstanding: Why do we experience emotional bodily feelings? What is their function? 
 
There is evidence that interoceptive sensitivity bears a general correlation with emotional 
sensitivity (e.g. Herbert et al. 2007; Calì et al 2015).17 However I think it most plausible that the 
additional intentional content provided by emotional bodily feelings is a form of self-monitoring. 
Emotions involve a fairly complex causal process, and it is typical for us to be able to attend to 
the different aspects of our bodily processes, particularly as we learn more about how our bodies 
function. It also makes sense from an evolutionary point of view that we are endowed with the 
ability to monitor our bodily responses (as opposed to sheer bodily sensation). By giving us a 
sense of our bodily capacities or powers, such monitoring contributes to planning. For example, 
                                                 
15
 ,DPRSHQWRWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWZKHWKHUWKHFRQFHSWµORYH¶LVDSSURSULDWHO\DSSOLHGWRDSDWWHUQRIERGLO\IHHOLQJV
may involve some social-H[WHUQDOLVWGHIHUHQFHWRKRZRQH¶VOLQJXLVWLFFRPPXQLW\FDWHJRULVHVHPRWLRQV)RUDYHU\
interesting defence of this notion see Campbell (1997).  
16
 Cases of pain asymbolia (e.g. Klein 2015) indicate that the sensation of pain and its badness can be distinguished, 
so even valence may not be as presentational as the core affect theorists imply. 
17
 InWHURFHSWLYH VHQVLWLYLW\KDVDOVREHHQ IRXQG WR IDFLOLWDWH UHIOHFWLYH UHDSSUDLVDORIRQH¶VHPRWLRQV )VW|VHW DO
2013), as well as the capacity to detect emotions in others (Terasawa et al. 2013). 
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LIRQHWHQVHVLQDQWLFLSDWLRQRIEHLQJKLWRQHFDQURXJKO\MXGJHWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKRQH¶VERG\LV
strong enough to withstand the blow. In a similar way, it is plausible that emotional 
self-monitoring is a key distinctive capacity that bodily feelings add to our everyday emotional 
experiences. By giving us a sense of our behavioural stance or dispositions, emotional bodily 
feelings contribute significantly to the planning and regulation of our emotionally driven 
behaviours.  
 
,I ,¶P ULJKW DERXW WKH Velf-monitoring function of bodily feelings, this may also explain some 
variations in the responses that we have towards certain emotionally arousing situations. I am 
WKLQNLQJLQSDUWLFXODURIWKHFDVHRIIHDU%HLQJDEOHWRHVWLPDWHRQH¶VSK\VLFDOFDSDFLW\ to deal 
with a threat could make a decisive difference between triggering a freeze response as opposed 
to flight response. That is, if one recognizes that one lacks the capacity to escape a threat, then 
the best behavioural strategy may be to freeze or play dead. It seems to me that this choice most 
plausibly follows the initial activation of the impulse to flee which is then inhibited, rather than 
IDLOLQJ WR DFWLYDWH WKH IOLJKW UHVSRQVH DW DOO FI .HYHU HW DO  ,QGHHG LI IUHH]LQJ GRHVQ¶W
work, the flight response may be best held in readiness. I take these considerations to align very 
QLFHO\ZLWKZKDWSV\FKRORJLVWVVXFKDV.ODXV6FKHUHUFDOODSSUDLVDOVRIµFRSLQJSRWHQWLDO¶
I even agree with Scherer that this sort of calculation should temporally follow initial emotional 
DSSUDLVDOVHJ6FKHUHUWDNHVFDOFXODWLRQVRIµJRDOUHOHYDQFH¶WREHVHTXHQWLDOO\SULRU 
 
A final implication of this view of bodily feelings is potentially quite profound. In taking us 
beyond the immediate impact upon our bodies and representing the subject as the centre of 
agency, as temporally enduring and spatially-oriented, bodily feelings in emotions constitute a 
basic form of self-consciousness. Given how early they are likely to appear in our lives, bodily 
feelings may even be some of the first mental states in which we become aware of ourselves as 
sources of agency extending into future, and as distinct from other persons. For these reasons, I 
VXPPDULVH ZKDW RXU ERGLO\ IHHOLQJV UHSUHVHQW DV µVWDWHV RI VHOI¶ ,Q HYHUyday emotional 
experience, these states of self are experienced alongside, and as more or less in alignment with 
the emotional experience of particular situations.18 
                                                 
18Cf. a comparable view outlined by Gallese & Sinigaglia (2010). Jan Slaby (2012) also explores the ways that 
emotions disclose a sense of self that is simultaneously the sense of ability. However he does not distinguish the 
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§4. The emotions debate 
The final points I would like to make in this paper concern its relevance to ongoing debates in 
the theory of emotions. Making a distinction between bodily feelings and object-directed 
emotions helps to explain the different ways that people conceptualize their emotions. The 
psychologist James Laird (2007) presents evidence from a large number of experiments that 
some people tend to recognize their emotions in terms of the context situations in which they are 
embedded, where others reflect more on their bodily feelings. Of course, this doesn¶t rule out the 
possibility that everyone is just wrong about how emotions are in fact constituted. But when it 
comes to how emotions are experienced, we may be more willing to accept a possible bifurcation 
of attention.  
 
One striking piece of evidence in favour of Laird¶s claim is the observation that some people are 
more susceptible than others to what is known as the µfacial feedback¶ effect.19 This is a 
phenomenon in which adopting facial expressions characteristic of certain emotions leads to both 
self-reports, physiological responses and behaviours indicative of those emotions. It seems that 
some people are prone to associate certain expressive reactions with the full blooded emotional 
state, even without explicitly noting the fact, where others look more towards the situation to 
assess what emotion they are in. That is, it seems that some people more readily conceptualize 
their bodily feelings under an emotional gestalt.  
 
The facial feedback effect might be thought to indicate that bodily reactions alone are sufficient 
for emotional states, independent of any representation of the way some situation impacts upon 
one¶s concerns. Our analysis should be a bit more complex than this however. We can admit that 
facial feedback may be sufficient to generate an emotional bodily feeling. These cases resemble 
                                                                                                                                                             
intentionality of bodily feeling from the intentionality of emotions themselves. Also comparable is Matthew 
5DWFOLIIH¶V  QRWLRQ RI µH[LVWHQWLDO IHHOLQJV¶ 7KHVH DUH YDULDWLRQV LQ RQH¶V EDVLF RULHQWDWLRQ WR WKH ZRUOG
LQFOXGLQJ DQ LQWXLWLYH FRQFHSWLRQ RI RQH¶V VHOI DQG DUH LQWHQGHG WR FDSWXUH SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO DVSHFWV RI YDULRXV
psychiatriFGLVRUGHUVUDQJLQJIURPGHSUHVVLRQWR&RWDUG¶VV\QGURPH7KHPDLQGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKLVDFFRXQWDQG
my own is that on my account bodily feelings can include both pervasive background feelings of the kind Ratcliffe 
describes, as well as the more transient and less profound feelings that accompany episodic emotions.  
19
 It should be noted that given a recent replication failure of one of the original experiments supporting facial 
feedback (Wagenmakers et al. replicating Strack, Martin & Strepper 1988), this phenomenon is currently under 
doubt. However Laird draws together a wide variety of data confirming the existence of this effect, in addition to 
making some useful qualifications about individual variability. 
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the kinds of long-term affective states lacking a prior appraisal that I described in §2.4. However, 
they are better described as moods than full-blown emotions. Then if the individual identifies 
some object as the target of their bodily feeling (as is often encouraged in the experiments Laird 
reports), they might now be said to be undergoing an emotional illusion. But if the cognitive bias 
generated by the mood leads them to actually appraise an object in a manner congruent with their 
bodily feeling, then we have a bona fide emotional state.  
 
The fact that people split into two broad groups in their conceptualization of emotions goes, I 
think, some way towards explaining the long-standing theoretical debate between those that 
support bodily-feeling based models of emotion and those that support situation-appraisal based 
models. Psychologists and philosophers may be driven by their intuitive attentional bias towards 
one or other aspect of emotional experience to prioritise that aspect in their theorizing. If 
emotional experiences have dual intentional content, we can allow that both parties are picking 
up on an important aspect of emotional experience. We can also understand why it is so hard to 
pin down the intentional nature of emotions.  
 
Let me be clear, I do not think emotions have to be conscious at all. I have not tried to justify this 
claim in this article, since my arguments for the double intentionality of emotional experience do 
not rely on it.20 Yet it is worth mentioning that such a view indicates that neither the emotional 
experience of a situation, nor the emotional bodily feeling need be more essential when it comes 
to characterising emotional experience. I have not said much about the emotional experience of 
particular situations here. I assume that we emotionally appraise particular situations, and that 
this process can happen consciously. And since I have claimed that the emotional experience of 
bodily responses requires an additional step of conceptual organisation, it may be that the 
emotional experience of a situation is less demanding and accordingly more ubiquitous. But 
since I hold that emotions always involve both an appraisal of a situation and a bodily response, 
the experience of either is sufficient for an emotional experience, and both are probably present 
in the average case.  
                                                 
20
 7KHEHVWHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFH,¶YHVHHQIRUJHQXLQHO\XQFRQVFLRXVHPRWLRQDVRSSRVHGWRPLVLQWHUSUHWHGPRRGV
is Winkielman and Berridge (2015). Here they show differences in behaviour as a result of masked emotional 
stimuli (pictures of happy and angry faces) while also confirming that the participants report no emotion at all, even 
when their attention is drawn towards how they are feeling. 
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§5. Conclusion 
I have argued that the experience of bodily feelings, while not strictly necessary to emotions, 
contributes intentional content to emotional experiences when it occurs. Our feelings tell us 
something about our current µstate of self¶²as solid and secure, or weak and contingent, 
enduring or transient. And although this content is represented intuitively by means of a 
non-literal sense of one¶s bodily condition in relation to an µemotional space¶, the status 
represented can be entirely warranted. It is to be analysed as an awareness of the disposition of 
the body towards interacting with the environment in a certain way.  
 
Overall, by appeal to the double intentionality of emotions, we can allow for the possibility that a 
subject can be aware of his or her feelings while simultaneously unaware of any particular 
situation to which his or her emotion is directed, and vice versa. We can also make sense of some 
of the difficulties in characterising emotional intentionality, and the general division between 
appraisal-based and bodily-feeling based models of emotion.  
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